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Aquinas, Finnis and Non-naturalism
Craig Paterson
1. Introduction
John Finnis’s work on natural law ethics (developed and refined with the help of
several key collaborators, most notably Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle), over
the past three decades, has been a source of controversy (both meta-ethical and
normative) in neo-Thomist circles.1 In analytical circles too, especially in
analytical jurisprudence, his work has also been a source of controversy. (I am not
here alluding to populist controversies that have resulted from the use of some of
his arguments in the “public square” on the topics of abortion, homosexuality,
coitus, and so on, although they too are phenomena that stem from the broad reach
of his discourse).
Finnis’s work is oftentimes a genuinely interesting source of controversy
because he is a thinker who has challenged a common key assumption of both neo-
Thomism and Analytical Philosophy, namely, that a natural law ethics (at least one
worthy of being called such) must be based on an appeal to some form of ethical
naturalism – that natural law is, at bottom, an ethics that seeks to derive or infer
normative “ought” type statements from descriptive “is” type statements. Coming
to terms with the nature of Finnis’s work has been a challenge for scholars from
different philosophical traditions because his own writing has drawn from a variety
of different sources and influences. He has, for example, used many insights drawn
from or inspired by Aquinas to challenge some of the neo-orthodoxies of
contemporary moral philosophy, especially its enduring infatuation with different
forms of emotivism or subjectivism. On the other hand, Finnis’s work has also been
influenced by the weave of meta-ethical discourse arising out of twentieth century
analytical philosophy.2
Because of Finnis’s appropriation of influences – both Thomist and Analytic –
this would seem to be more than enough to classify him as an Analytical Thomist, at
least according to the guidelines given by John Haldane, whom in 1997 first coined
the phrase to describe the crisscross of influence between Thomism and Analytical
Philosophy.3 When looking at the work of Finnis and then reflecting on the term
Analytical Thomism, it strikes me as both noteworthy and praiseworthy that the
term’s frame of reference (at least as used by Haldane) is decidedly latitudinarian.
There are no strict tests laid down for inclusion or exclusion. Thus when applied to
a consideration of some of the major divisions being used in contemporary meta-
ethical theory, the term’s aegis is broad enough to include an objectivist-cognitivist
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approach to meta-ethics that could be either naturalistic or non-naturalistic (I
would, however, strongly doubt that the term could be further broadened to include
any style of ethical theory that rejects the claim that ethics is ultimately grounded
on an objectively structured moral order accessible to human reason.)
An examination of the contribution of Finnis to natural law ethics, then, is
apropos for a collection of essays on Analytical Thomism because he is recognized
as a jurisprud-philosopher whose mode of approaching philosophy, with its
emphasis on the unaided or autonomous use of human reason, is helpful in
promoting an understanding of natural law ethics across different philosophical
traditions. His approach is also especially useful in the context of trying to make a
natural law based ethics more accessible to people who reject the traditional
allegiance of natural law with the truths of revealed theology (thus taking the sting
out of the quip, once popular among secular moralists, that natural law theory was
“baptized reason”). He is well-known for his clear commitment to arguing for the
open accessibility of a natural law based ethics thereby defending it against the
claim that it cannot function as a basis for “publicly reasonable” discourse in
contemporary pluralistic society.4 This points to an important time honored use of
the term “natural” that renders intelligible Finnis’s commitment to the phrase
“natural law,” despite being a meta-ethical non-naturalist – the contrast between the
“natural” and the “supernatural.” Natural law qua natural should not be
conceptually confused with any form of supernaturally imposed extrinsicism –
whether of divine reason (the eternal logos) or of the divine will (divine command
theory). Finnis’s work then is “ripe” for engagement is a book devoted to an
exploration of different themes in Analytical Thomism.
In this chapter I seek to examine the credibility of Finnis’s basic stance on
Aquinas that while many neo-Thomists are meta-ethically naturalistic in their
understanding of natural law theory (for example, Heinrich Rommen, Henry
Veatch, Ralph McInerny, Russell Hittinger, Benedict Ashley and Anthony Lisska),
Aquinas’s own meta-ethical framework avoids the “pitfall” of naturalism.5 On
examination, the short of it is that I find Finnis’s account (while adroit) wanting in
the interpretation stakes vis-à-vis other accounts of Aquinas’s meta-ethical
foundationalism. I think that the neo-Thomists are basically right to argue that for
Aquinas we cannot really understand objective truths about moral standards unless
we derive them from our intellective knowledge of natural facts as given to us by
the essential human nature that we have. (A position, I think, very close to that of
Aristotelian-functionalism.)
While I find Finnis’s interpretative position on Aquinas wanting, I go on to argue
that his own attachment to non-naturalism is justified and should not be jettisoned.
Because I think non-naturalism important to the future tenability of a viable natural
law ethics (an ethics that is both cognitive and objectivist), I argue that Finnis
should, so to speak, “beef up” his “fundamental option” for non-naturalism and
more fully avail himself of certain argumentative strategies available in its defense,
argumentative strategies that are inspired by the analytical philosophy of G. E.
Moore.
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2. Naturalism and Neo-Scholasticism
Some neo-scholastic natural law thinkers like Heinrich Rommen, Henry Veatch
and Ralph McInerny, according to Finnis, invoke the authority of Aquinas in
support of their own naturalistic meta-ethical reading of natural law fundamentals.6
A common core of argumentation running through their approaches to natural law
theory is that they all, ultimately, seek to derive moral norms from their
interpretation of factual-descriptive propositions about human nature. According to
their shared approach, practical reasoning (ratio practica) – reasoning about what
ought-to-be-done by the agent – necessarily hinges on what is variously termed
“theoretical” or “speculative” reasoning – reasoning about the “is” of human
nature. They argue that we derive ethical norms from our prior factual-theoretical
knowledge of what human beings are in essentialibus. We understand the
origination of ethical norms when we understand the natural ordering of our
inclinations as given to us by our ontological make-up.
For Finnis, many neo-scholastics take it as a near given that human acts in
conformity with the trajectories of nature (as theoretically understood), are morally
good, and acts not in conformity with nature, so understood, are morally bad. They
argue that Aquinas’s first principle of practical reason – “bonum est faciendum et
prosequendum et malum vitandum” (good is to be done and pursued and evil
avoided) – is a moral command incumbent on the agent to pursue and promote the
given trajectories or functions of human nature.7 Thus we establish what is
normatively good for us by metaphysical inquiry into the structures of human nature.8
Regarding the metaphysical naturalism of neo-scholasticism, Finnis thinks that
there is good reason to reject its tenability as a meta-ethical foundation. Post-
Enlightenment philosophy has, he believes, rightly rejected the soundness of any
appeal to the metaphysical facts of nature as being an adequate meta-ethical basis
for warranting the inference of valid ethical norms. For Finnis, the meta-ethical
approach of neo-scholasticism falls afoul of this charge because it illicitly attempts
to derive (infer/deduce) moral norms from a series of factual-theoretical premises
about what is.9
Finnis and the neo-scholastics at least agree that the locus classicus of the dispute
over the tenability of naturalism can be traced back to a key passage in David
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature:
In every system of morality I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d that the
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being
of a God or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am
surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is and is not, I meet
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or ought not. This change is
imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not
expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it should be observ’d and
explain’d; and at the same time a reason should be given for what seems altogether
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely
different from it.10
Hume’s central point was that if you want to give a valid argument for a normative
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conclusion, you will need to start, at the very outset, with a normative premise.
Finnis certainly interprets Hume as meaning something like this. From non-
normative premises (about what is), we cannot derive a normative conclusion
(about what ought-to-be or conversely about what ought-not-to-be).11 Consider
here what D. J. O’Connor in his Aquinas and the Natural Law has to say on the
matter. While Finnis would reject O’Connor’s charge of naturalism as directed
against Aquinas, he would surely concur with the following:
The whole discussion [deriving an “ought” from an “is”] seems to confuse two senses of
‘good’ as (i) what is sought after, and (ii) what ought to be sought after …. Granted that
the good life for man must somehow be grounded in human nature, how do we argue
from the facts of human nature to the values of morality? As Hume notoriously showed,
the gap between fact and value cannot be bridged by logical argument.12
The key problem with naturalism, for Finnis (and O’Connor), is its attempt to
perform an untenable leap between fact and value, between the descriptive and the
normative. Finnis rejects any neo-scholastic approach that breaches this key post-
Enlightenment meta-ethical axiom.13
Finnis thus faces a challenge. If this key axiom is not ill-founded, as he believes,
then either Aquinas, so interpreted, is guilty of breaching it or the neo-scholastic
interpretation of Aquinas must be faulty. For Finnis, O’Connor is right in his
assessment of the fact/value distinction but wrong in attributing a naturalistic
breach of that distinction to Aquinas.14 O’Connor, so to speak, “sins” but once. The
neo-scholastics, however, “sin” twice. They are wrong in their rejection of the
central validity of the fact/value distinction and they are also wrong in their claim
that Aquinas was, like them, a meta-ethical naturalist. This therefore places Finnis
in the position of having to tackle head-on some deeply held “misunderstandings”
about Aquinas’s meta-ethical foundations. As Finnis forthrightly states in his later
work Aquinas:
Nor, of course, can the genuine first practical principles be ‘speculative’ (‘theoretical’,
that is, non-practical) propositions about what is the case, e.g. about human nature. Some
commentators on Aquinas have imagined that they are such propositions …. In short, the
‘ought’ of first practical principles is not deducible from ‘is’, whether from ‘is willed by
God’ or from ‘has been prescribed by me myself’.15
The thrust of Finnis’s objection to metaphysical (anthropological,
theological …) naturalism can be best illustrated here by means of an example.
Imagine that you are trying to prove the status of an ethical proposition:
(a) I ought to do X.
Imagine also that you are a metaphysical naturalist.
The premise by which you seek to derive (a) is:
(b) My essence tells me to pursue X.
(a) does not follow from (b).
To make a valid inference an extra premise must be added:
(c) If my essence tells me to pursue X then I ought to pursue X.
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The problem with the leap from (b) to (a) in the eyes of Finnis and many analytical
philosophers is, I think, neatly described in an older 1940s text, A. N. Prior’s, Logic
and the Basis of Ethics. A moral norm cannot be derived unless moral norms are
already included as part of the premises of the argument. The conclusion of a valid
syllogism cannot contain terms that do not appear in the premises. So a proposition
involving an “ought” cannot be deduced from premises that are, so to speak,
“ought-less.”16 Finnis would, I think, accept the thrust of this description of
naturalism because it helps us see why attempts to establish ethical norms
naturalistically are thought mistaken. Instead, for Finnis (if we are to avoid the
pitfalls of emotivism or subjectivism), we need to begin the ethical journey via a
different route – with practical reason’s direct unmediated apprehension of basic
human goods for us.17 For Finnis, these goods are directly grasped via the operation
of practical reason – that is, reasoning about what is to be done. Practical reason, as
Finnis interprets it, furnishes its own starting points for its own operations.
Normative beginnings are not supplied to it as a product generated by way of
conclusion from prior speculative inquiry. When reasoning practically about what
kinds of action are worthy of choice, we are able to spontaneously grasp the
significance of these goods and pursue them as the intelligible starting points that
underpin the pursuit of all worthwhile human action.18
3. Naturalism and Aquinas
Fortunately, according to Finnis, Aquinas himself was not guilty of an attempt to
derive ethics from truths first established and asserted by prior theoretical inquiry.
He did not attempt to derive or infer the starting points of ethical thinking from
factual-theoretical premises. Normative starting points are sui generis. Aquinas,
correctly understood, is really a defender of what might be called the “autonomy of
ethics” position, a position which rejects the claim that our understanding of moral
starting points can be derived from (or reduced to) a factual examination of human
nature. As Finnis states:
So [for Aquinas] the epistemic source of the first practical principles is not human nature
or a prior, theoretical understanding of human nature (though a theoretical knowledge of
the efficacy, as means, of certain choosable conduct is relevant to our knowledge of the
first practical principles). Rather, the epistemic relationship is the reverse: any deep
understanding of human nature, that is, of the capacities which will be fulfilled by action
which participates in and realizes those goods, those perfections, is an understanding
which has amongst its sources our primary, undemonstrated but genuine practical
knowledge of those goods and purposes.19
Finnis acknowledges that Aquinas usually wrote as a theologian or metaphysician.
Consequently it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the normative basis of his
natural law ethics from his discussion of other (speculative) disciplines.20 His
discussion of practical reason, however, for Finnis, holds the key to understanding
his basic ethical approach. For Aquinas, something is good, right, or just “by
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nature” only to the extent that it is in accordance with the measure of reason,
specifically practical reason.21 Aquinas distinguished between two forms of human
reasoning – speculative reasoning and practical reasoning. In drawing a distinction
between the speculative and the practical, Aquinas was acknowledging that the
intellect has two distinct modes of engagement and each mode has its own unique
and non-demonstrative first principle. Finnis draws heavily upon ST I–II, q. 94.22
The first principle of speculative reasoning (FPSR) is the principle of non-
contradiction, “the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time.”
The first principle of practical reasoning (FPPR) is “good is to be done and pursued
and evil is to be avoided.” These two self-evident principles address different
primary concerns. Speculative reasoning is concerned with “what-is.” Practical
reasoning is concerned with “what-is-to-be.” According to Finnis, this division was
adhered to by Aquinas because he understood that the ethical quest was thoroughly
practical in all dimensions of its genesis and operation. Norms, for Aquinas, are not
derived from theoretical inquiry but from prior norms traceable back to FPPR. As
Finnis states:
… for Aquinas, the way to discover what is morally right (virtue) and wrong (vice) is to
ask, not what is in accordance with human nature, but what is reasonable. And this quest
will eventually bring one back to the underived first principles of practical
reasonableness, principles which make no reference at all to human nature, but only to
human good … the ‘natural’ is, for the point of view of his ethics, a speculative
appendage added by way of metaphysical reflection, not a counter with which to advance
either to or from the practical prima principia per se nota.23
A key problem with neo-scholastic interpretations, for Finnis, concerns the
meaning of FPPR. Finnis does not interpret this as being a moral imperative.
Instead, it is a “not-yet-moral” directive for human action. In a manner analogous to
FPSR, a principle presupposed in all speculative thinking, FPPR is presupposed in
all acts of practical thinking (whether morally good or not). In consequence, the
principle, for Finnis, cannot be interpreted as a moral command, for not all practical
thinking is moral in nature. FPPR refers not to what is morally good but to all forms
of what is considered intelligibly worthwhile for agents to pursue. If it were a moral
principle commanding us to do moral good and avoid moral evil, Finnis thinks it
would lose its credibility as a genuine self-evident principle presupposed in all acts
of practical reasoning.24
On Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas, in-so-far as Aquinas is viewed as a
philosopher (operating under the light of natural reason, and not as a theologian
presupposing supernatural revelation), the good to be pursued in general
(happiness; flourishing; imperfect beatitude), is really a composite of several non-
reducible and basic goods that are directly (per se nota) apprehended and found to
be intrinsically fulfilling for us – goods like human life, knowledge and
friendship.25 How then do we move from our apprehension of FPPR understood as
“X (human life, friendship …) is a good to be pursued and preserved …” to the
moral realm? For Finnis, Aquinas bases his understanding of morality upon the
degree of full practical reasonableness instantiated in the exercise of human choice.
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The exercise of human choice is key to the transition between the directive and the
morally normative. We recognize the basic good of practical reasonableness itself
and also its architectonic role in guiding all worthwhile human action.26 Morally
good choices are choices that openly and expansively pursue and promote the bona
humana. Conversely bad choices are choices that unduly limit or foreclose our
pursuit of these goods. In short, morally right action = practically reasonable action
and morally wrong action = practically unreasonable action.
4. Aquinas the Non-Naturalist?
As I said in my introduction, Finnis’s account of Aquinas’s ethics is nothing if not
adroit. Nor can he be accused of approaching his analysis of Aquinas without gusto
or without being inspired by a deep intellectual love for his work. It is not his lack
of familiarity with Aquinas’s work or his lack of intellectual passion that is in
question however. Instead what leads me to question and ultimately reject the
credibility of his non-naturalistic interpretation of Aquinas is what I would call the
“lens of bias” by which he approaches his subject matter. Finnis (spurred on, no
doubt, by laudable motives of “intellectual rescue”) distorts the historical Aquinas
by interpreting Aquinas as if he (Finnis) were wearing an analytical pair of
spectacles, enabling himself, so equipped, to “reconstruct” Aquinas as a post-
Enlightenment compatible thinker.
I say this, of course, as one very sympathetic to some of the meta-ethical goals of
Finnis’s project. Alas, his project – of establishing and defending a non-naturalistic
foundationalism – cannot be anchored in Aquinas’s work. Without claiming the
traditional authority of Aquinas in support, Finnis’s own project must stand
justified, if justified it is, upon its own free-standing merits.
The main claim I wish to challenge in Finnis’s account is his assertion that
practical reason and speculative reason are very different in their respective modes
such that the practical, with regard to the structure of its own operations, functions
autonomously and cannot be regarded as a dependent form of reason parasitical on
the speculative.27 In my understanding of Aquinas, however, speculative reasoning
is heavily implicated in the structural make up of the practical intellect, for there is,
in substantialibus, only one intellect not two.28 Finnis formally acknowledges this
unity, but time and again he treats the two as if they were de facto very different
kinds of mental power.29 Finnis, in his reading, I think, effectively bifurcates the
substantial unity of the human intellect such that there is a near severance of the
deep organic relationship that, for Aquinas, exists between the speculative and the
practical.
Finnis fuels this bifurcation with his tendency to equate the speculative with the
purely theoretical, especially with scientia – systematic theoretical inquiry into the
nature of the physical constitution of the natural world, of the nature of
metaphysical properties, and so on.30 Finnis thus tends to neglect the reality, for
Aquinas, that “speculation” can be about the ordinary data or facts of everyday
human experience. For Aquinas, truth adequated towards action cannot be divorced
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from truth adequated towards “that which is” for understanding of the former is
contingent on our understanding of the latter (even if only in a very simple and
unsystematic way). As Aquinas states in his ST I q. 79, a. 11:
On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical … . But one
power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are
not distinct powers.31
Aquinas then answers:
The reason of which is that … what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power,
does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing …. Now, to a thing
apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or
not …32
Due to this emphasis on the grand autonomy of practical reason, Finnis effectively
seeks to turn an accidental difference between the speculative and the practical
intellect into a substantial difference thereby tacitly creating what amounts to a
distinct “nature” for each. This interpretative move is central to Finnis’s
understanding of Aquinas because of his analytical concern that there must be a
fundamental difference between how we come to have knowledge of facts and how
we come to have knowledge of values. Now Finnis argues that what he is really
doing here is simply recognizing an epistemic distinction between different modes
of knowing and that he is not therefore asserting a quite different point about the
two intellects having any substantially different ontological foundation.33 As John
Haldane succinctly states, however, when considering the relationship of
epistemology to metaphysics in Aquinas’s thought, there can be “no epistemology
without ontology.”34 This “carving-off” of the epistemic as a discrete
consideration, independent of any ontological fall-out, is alien to Aquinas’s
thought, because, for Aquinas, an epistemic division of this kind between the
speculative and the practical would have deep ontological ramifications – it would
ontologically entail a per se difference and not just a per accidens difference
between the speculative and the practical intellects. Aquinas, as stated above ST I,
q. 79, a. 11, would explicitly reject any substantial difference between the
speculative and the practical. Such a difference would not be circumstantial or
accidental.
Finnis’s bifurcation of the speculative and practical also informs his
interpretation of ST I–II, q. 94. In his attempt to maintain the epistemic autonomy of
the practical from the speculative, Finnis passes over the structural dependency that
exists in Aquinas’s article between our knowledge of FPSR and our coming to
know FPPR. The truth of FPSR is first understood by the intellect prior to its
recognition of the truth of FPPR. Good is to be done and evil avoided, presupposes
the truth of non-contradiction. A good, therefore, cannot be both good and evil in
the same respect. Finnis seeks to denude Aquinas’s FPPR of any necessary
structural dependency on the recognition of prior speculative truth, but this is not
Aquinas’s position, for FPPR can only have a claim to be self-evident if FPSR is
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presupposed in FPPR’s initial apprehension and subsequent application. Without
the recognition of speculative truth in the former there could be no truth as directed
towards action in the latter. As Aquinas states in the body of ST I–II, q. 94:
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For
that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is “being,” the notion of which is
included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable
principle is that “the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,” which
is based on the notion of “being” and “not-being”: and on this principle all others are
based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9.35
Finnis supposes that a claim of per se notum self-evidence concerning a first
principle cannot entail the initial epistemic dependency of one principle on the
other. Now Finnis would be right if Aquinas were speaking directly and not by
analogy about the status of FPPR. Yet for Aquinas, the self-evidence of FPPR is
mentioned by analogy only in comparison with FPSR in order to explain how it
seems that our knowledge of FPPR appears so immediate and direct. Perspective
here is all important, and too much reliance on the strength of this analogy is apt to
mislead. When viewed in own domain FPPR can be said to have a per se notum
status, but by analogy only, because, strictly speaking, when viewed absolutely,
against the wider dominium eminens of reason in general, the analogy breaks down
due to the structural dependency of FPPR on FPSR. Use of this analogy in ST I–II,
q. 94, therefore, due to its relative weakness, cannot be expected to bear the weight
of argument that Finnis seeks to attribute to it in his interpretation of Aquinas’s
meta-ethics.
Finnis’s own meta-ethical commitments help explain his position that practical
reason is said to apprehend, independent of speculative inquiry, what is good.
Aquinas, however, was not committed to such a position. As Aquinas states in the
body of ST I–II, q. 94:
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it
is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended
by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as
evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is
the order of the precepts of the natural law.
Here again, I think, we encounter another statement in the Summa theologicae that
expresses the structural order of entailment that exists between the two intellects.
The practical intellect is not free to regard any old good as good. It is, in its own
operations, dependent upon prior conclusions reached by the operations of the
speculative intellect. The aspect of the good of a thing is determined by its
fittingness to a natural end (and the ordering of sub-ends to a natural end). Our
speculative intellect first recognizes knowledge of our natural human ends. Only
then is it possible to speak of something being good because it is fitting to a natural
human end. For Aquinas, the speculative apprehends the inclinations of our nature,
not in any exalted sense of grand metaphysical theory but in a more commonplace
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sense of grasping basic conceptual patterns about the ways in which human nature
is ordered. Practical reason takes these conclusions of speculative reasoning as its
own practical starting points, now viewed under the aspect of good, as directed
towards action. This, is, I think, the thrust of Aquinas’s thinking here, a stance that
is actually thoroughly Aristotelian in shape. What underpins Aquinas’s account of
the ordering of the natural inclinations is basically Aristotle’s ergon argument
presented in the Nicomachean Ethics. For Aquinas, like Aristotle, our
understanding of what is good is structurally dependent on our speculative
understanding of the functions of human nature (again, not necessarily speculative
in any schematic grand sense). This, of course, is hardly surprising given that
Aquinas was writing a commentary on Aristotle’s ethics, his Sententia libri
Ethicorum, while he was also engaged in writing the second part of the ST.36 In that
text he comments with approval on many of Aristotle’s meta-ethical conclusions.
Another claim that, I think, does not express Aquinas’s position concerning the
status of FPPR is Finnis’s assertion that FPPR is a not-yet-moral principle, for not
all practical thinking is moral in nature. If it were a moral principle it would lose its
claim to be self-evident. Firstly, Finnis interpretation downplays Aquinas’s explicit
use of authoritatively commanding language in the context of his discussion on the
foundations of natural law in ST I–II q. 94 – time and again Aquinas states that
nature law prescribes – law is a rule or measure and to prescribe is to command.
For Aquinas it would be terminologically bizarre to say that a prescription of the
natural law determines the scope of all our subsequent human actions and is yet
pre-moral. Finnis’s focus on the grammatical “is-to-be” is really an attempt to
fashion a pivotal change in meaning on the turn of a phrase that could as equally
well be rendered “Do good and avoid evil” or “You ought to do good and avoid
evil.” Secondly, his interpretation is based on the misapprehension – that since all
human action whether morally good or morally bad presupposes the use of
practical reason – the FPPR cannot itself be a moral principle. This puzzle between
the moral and the not-yet-moral only emerges, however, if we assert that the entire
moral realm must axiomatically be equated with the exercise of human choice. This
way of understanding the scope of morality, however, is not Aquinas’s, and is
decidedly more modernist in its pedigree. For Aquinas, simply because we cannot
but help participate in a good, does not therefore entail that our participation in that
good is not itself a moral act, responding to a moral command, even if it is not
possible to do otherwise and yet remain human. Thus to participate by our very
being in the kind of good practical reason is, is itself to be in the moral realm even if
it is, ontologically speaking, a non-negotiable imposition offending against our
modern notions that moral principles must presuppose freedom of choice.37 Simply
because FPPR is a moral command, this does not mean that we cannot, de facto,
either deny its moral bindingness upon us or subsequently restrict our participation
in the good of practical reason by thwarting the fullness of our subsequent
participation in that good. There is no good reason, therefore, to reject the moral
status of the FPPR in Aquinas’s moral system.
Drawing my discussion of Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas to a close, as brief
as it is, I would like to mention one final textual difficulty that emerges with
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Finnis’s non-naturalist interpretation of Aquinas. It concerns Aquinas’s discussion,
in various passages of the Summa theologicae, of the “vitia contra naturam.”
Aquinas, for example, states the following while discussing masturbation, sodomy,
and so on in ST II–II q. 154, a. 11:
[W]herever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered
unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First,
through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lustful vices; secondly,
because, in addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to
the human race: and this is called “the unnatural vice.”38
How can any plausible interpretation of this text be reconciled with a non-
naturalistic interpretation of Aquinas? Finnis merely dismisses instances of such
texts, trotted out to support a “perverted faculty argument,” as being ridiculous.39
Yet as Patrick Lee, a Finnisian, admits in an article of his, “His [Aquinas’s]
argument … seems naturalist. He seems here to hold that one’s actions must not
only conform to the order of reason, but also conform to the order set by nature.”40
Lee’s response to the problem of reconciliation, while an improvement over Finnis,
is also unsatisfactory because his response essentially amounts to discounting the
significance of these passages as a series of careless and unreflective slides into
naturalism, slides that “… do not cohere with what he says explicitly, and with care,
about the first principles of morality and the general principles of the virtues.”41
On the contrary, pace Lee, I would strongly argue that when Aquinas states that
there are sins against nature he is being quite explicit and consistent with his
underlying functional understanding of the inclinationes naturales. He is, in 
short, merely displaying his credentials as both a committed and a consistent
naturalist. The structure of Aquinas’s argument is overtly functionalist,
presupposing a knowledge of the ordering of the sexual organs towards their
natural given ends. The same kind of functionalist argument (albeit occurring in
less sensational contexts) is used time and again elsewhere in ST (for example, a
human being has two eyes; a human being normally has two eyes; two eyes
promote better sight than one eye; ergo it is good for a human being to have two
eyes). If voluntary actions involving the genitals accord with natural teleology they
are judged fitting and virtuous, if not, they are judged unfitting and vicious. Grasp
the natural ordering of a given function and actions that intentionally promote its
natural ordering are good and actions that intentionally thwart its natural ordering
are bad.
Aquinas’s naturalism cannot be dismissed here as a set of distractions from his
otherwise reflective commitment to non-naturalism, any more than his repeated
invocations of Ulpian’s “natural law is what nature has taught all animals” can,
because these texts simply express, again, more crudely, Aquinas’s already firmly
established commitment to Aristotelian ethical naturalism.
Contra Finnis, there is therefore good reason to think that Aquinas did not
support a meta-ethical position that was essentially non-naturalistic. Again, I think,
it seems as if a Finnisan interpretation of Aquinas is not so much about discovering
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the historical Aquinas as it is about reconstructing Aquinas’s thought in the image
and likeness of, well, an Analytical Thomist of the non-naturalistic variety.
5. Finnis’s and Non-Naturalism
As we have seen, Finnis, due to his acceptance of the fact/value distinction, has
rejected the tenability of ethical naturalism as a viable meta-ethical option.
Normative statements cannot be derived or inferred from non-normative
statements. The sources of normativity cannot be reduced to natural kinds or
reduced to the natural properties of natural kinds. Given the significance Finnis
attaches to rejecting naturalism and supporting his fundamental option for non-
naturalism, there is, I think, a comparative lack of developed argumentative
discourse in the Finnisian corpus that (a) defends non-naturalism against the claims
that it is itself unsustainable because it is based on a dodgy metaphysics, rendering
it decidedly queer to right minded meta-ethicists, and (b) spells out more fully the
weaknesses inherent in Thomistic accounts of naturalism. The reiteration of the
fact/value distinction, as a trump card, will not alas suffice. Both these areas of
discourse, I think, need to be more fully developed if Finnis and his followers are to
further advance their fundamental option for a non-naturalistic meta-ethical
foundationalism, especially when confronted with a tradition of natural law inquiry
that, due to the influence of Aristotle and Aquinas, has been heavily committed to
ethical naturalism.
Before turning to the task of examining criticisms of non-naturalism and
sketching out a defense, an important caveat on scope is needed. I cannot begin to
tackle both the abovementioned areas of discourse in this chapter. I can hardly
begin to do any justice to (a) let alone examine (b). Consequently I will only
attempt to address a couple of key arguments that help defend the case of non-
naturalism. Insofar as these arguments also serve to question the viability of
Aristotelian-Thomistic naturalism, case (b) will also be touched upon. (If I had the
space to elaborate on my problems with Aristotelian-Thomistic naturalism, I would
focus on the tenability of the claim that we can determine a unique and
characteristic “function for man” – an ergon – that is (i) naturalistically derived, (ii)
sufficiently determinate, (iii) normatively prescriptive, and yet (iv) is not deeply
question-begging.)42
Turning now to the task of defending non-naturalism, a misplaced criticism
directed against Finnis’s non-naturalism can quickly be set aside, for it amounts to
arguing that since non-naturalism is currently an unfashionable trend in
philosophical circles, Finnis should (on pain of being unfashionable?) change his
basic meta-ethical allegiance. Finnis should be swimming with the current not
against it.43 Truth, however, is not contingent on trends. If that were not so, then, by
the same token, neo-Thomists ought to have abandoned, in the face of many
fashionable consequentialist waves, their own defense of material moral absolutes.
Finnis, therefore, need not be too concerned with the stigma of being labeled some
sort of “meta-ethical fashion victim.”
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Another line of criticism has more substance to it but is itself ultimately based on
a mistaken impression of what a defense of the fact/value distinction must amount to
in terms of the relationship between facts and values. A wall of separation is said to
be built up between the two such that facts and values do not meaningfully relate to
one another, ergo the fallacious nature of the naturalistic fallacy.44 Norms, however,
are related to facts but not by way of attempting to derive the former from the latter.
First, facts furnish us with the data of possibility (or impossibility). As Kant said
“ought implies can.” With life we have the possibility of experiencing; with sight we
have the possibility of viewing many different visual sensations, and so on. Without
natural facts we cannot pursue health, knowledge, play, beauty, and so on. No
supporter of the naturalistic fallacy, therefore, need be committed to the untenable
position that facts are ethically irrelevant. If facts create the wings of possibility,
they also burn away the wings of possibility. Because I am not a “little god” I do not
have super-human powers. Because I cannot be in two places at the same time, I
cannot simultaneously teach in class and study in the library, and so on.
Facts are also indispensable for fleshing out the demands of correctly established
normative premises, for example, normative premises derived from prior
normative premises (ultimately traceable back to underived normative starting
points). Given that there is a normative duty not to intentionally kill another human
being, it is a crucially relevant fact that X is a human being and not a rat or a pigeon.
Given that there is a normative obligation to help rescue a drowning person, I am
(unless there is an acceptable excuse) bound to render assistance. Here it is relevant
to know (1) whether I knew that another person was drowning, and (2), that I had
the physical capacity to be able to render assistance. The supporter of the
naturalistic fallacy, therefore, need not be committed to the maintenance of an
untenable wall of separation between facts and norms, for facts implicate norms
and norms implicate facts in many vital ways.
Moving on, the criticism of Finnis’s meta-ethics made by Jean Porter packs more
of a punch and is illustrative of a set of ontological concerns with his project that do
need to be more fully addressed.45 She criticizes Finnis’s explanation of the status
of the basic human goods. She argues that Finnis’s talk of basic human goods is
really talk about mysterious metaphysical entities. She asserts that Finnis is unclear
as to what the ontological or logical status of the basic human goods is. Just what is
the relationship of these entities to the world of natural objects and properties? For
Porter, Finnis speaks of basic human goods as if they were Platonic forms enjoying
an independent existence of their own. She concludes that Finnis is guilty of a
“hypostatization” of the basic human goods.
Two Finnisian followers, Gerard Bradley and Robert George, have sought to
clarify Finnis’s views on the status of the basic human goods. They reply that the
basic human goods are simply underived goods, they are irreducible, they are
intrinsic not extrinsic to human beings, and they are all self-evident truths grasped
by the operation of practical reason.46 I am afraid, however, this reply does not
really advance discussion very far because there is no deep explanation provided as
to what the underlying ontological status of these goods actually is. Bradley and
George respond to the charge of “hypostatization” in the following terms:
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[It is necessary to] insist on the distinction [between speculative and practical reason]
because without it morality would be reduced to nature and such reductionism is bad
metaphysics which blocks understanding of morality …. They [Finnis et al.] then defend
the irreducibility of morality to nature by pointing to the logical irreducibility of moral
ought to theoretical is.47
Now I agree with Finnis’s autonomy of ethics thesis that denies the reducibility of
the ethical to the non-ethical and I also agree with Finnis’s claim concerning the
logical distinctiveness of what “ought to be” from “that which is” (being a meta-
ethical sympathizer, I am so disposed), but all this, without further detailed
explication and analysis of the ontological status of the basis human goods, merely
serves to sidestep the central thrust of Porter’s critique, not answer it. Critics (meta-
ethical opponents), will, in short, be under-whelmed by such a response. Even if,
for the purpose of argument, we were to agree that X exerts a direct unmediated
normative pull and that this normative pull seems to be uniquely apprehended by
our practical intellect, Porter would be entitled to assert, “you haven’t really
answered my question. What are the ontological entailments of such moral
phenomena? What exactly is the metaphysical status of this X such that is said to
generate a normative click of recognition in the practical intellect?”
Although Porter’s critique is specifically directed at Finnis, she is engaged in a
line of criticism (in her case to support a naturalistic anthropology) that typifies a
broader charge laid at the door of non-naturalism – namely, that non-naturalism,
once smoked out of the closet, is metaphysically queer and cannot therefore be
taken seriously as a basic meta-ethical stance. The critique advanced by Porter is
actually rather similar to the thrust of criticism traditionally directed against the
non-naturalism of G. E. Moore. This is hardly surprising, once we reflect on it,
since Finnis and Moore, protests to the contrary notwithstanding, actually share a
number of similarities in terms of their basic meta-ethical underpinnings (non-
naturalism; defense of intrinsic goods; intuitionism; non-reductionism, and so
on).48 J. L. Mackie’s famous charge against Moorean non-naturalism still rings
loud today, a charge that is broad enough in scope to cover all forms of non-
naturalism. For Mackie, non-naturalism can charitably be described as the product
of a fevered philosophical imagination, an imagination that, having rejected
naturalism, proceeds to posit the ad hoc existence of a mysterious realm of being in
order to maintain an aura of objectivity when claiming to make moral judgments.49
6. Attributive v. Predicative Good
Peter Geach is one of the foremost Analytical Thomists (of the naturalistic variety)
who has sought to reject both the viability of non-naturalism and to defend the
credibility of Aristotelian-Thomistic functionalism. Geach is particularly
dismissive of the very idea that goodness can be understood in the Moorean terms
as a simple, indefinable, non-natural property. Although I cannot pretend to give
Geach’s work on the logical status of “good” the attention here it deserves, I hope
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nevertheless to say enough concerning his Good and Evil to outline the kind of
critical approach that, I think, a Finnisian would need to take in order to counter the
charge that “good” can only be used attributively and not predicatively.50
Geach starts by getting us to address the question, what, if anything, did “good”
mean if not the natural properties of a “good X”? Geach is perplexed by non-
naturalism’s denial that one could not appeal to the natural features or properties of
a thing in order to account for our ethical assessment of it. In short, Geach thinks it
bad philosophy to speak of “good” as a non-natural property. As Geach states,
“nobody has ever given a coherent and understandable account of what it is for an
attribute to be non-natural.”51
The first line of attack Geach uses is to expose the logical-grammatical errors he
perceives being perpetrated by defenders of non-naturalism. The second line of
response is to show how the logical status of propositions about the “good,” correctly
understood, are conducive to supporting an Aristotelian-Thomistic functionalism. In
order to advance the first claim, he draws attention to what he identifies as a key
difference between the use of good as a “predicative adjective” and the use of good
as an “attributive adjective.” An adjective is predicative in Geach’s usage if it fits the
following criterion, If X is AB, then X is A and X is B. Thus take the statement
“Cedric is a red parrot.” Since Cedric is a red parrot, Cedric is red and Cedric is a
parrot. Further, if Cedric is a red parrot and all parrots are birds then Cedric is a red
bird. For Geach, however, it is not the case that we can talk of good in such
predicative ways. Thus “Cedric is a good parrot,” cannot be rendered Cedric is good
and Cedric is a parrot, for we are concerned with Cedric as a “good what?”
If the predicative use of good were indeed verboten, a Finnisian (not just a
Moorean) would find it exceedingly difficult to reject the naturalistic claim that “X
is good” is equivalent to “X is a good AB” where AB just are the natural properties
of things we apparently evaluate all the time in everyday life. There can be no good
simpliciter. There is no ontological space left for such an understanding of
goodness, for, as Geach states, “There is no such thing as being just good or bad,
there is only being a good or bad so-and-so.”52
In order to respond to Geach’s argument (and begin to address the aura of
suspicion hanging over the status of a basic human good), a Finnisian must, I think,
tackle head on Geach’s claim that good cannot have appropriate predicative as well
as attributive uses. While I think Geach’s challenge can be overcome, the following
brief remarks must, alas, suffice as indicative of the kind of line that I think a
plausible counter-response to Geach’s dismissal ought to take.
Consider the characteristics of a napalm bomb. Geach wants to say that we
cannot claim that X is simply bad or simply good only whether X is good or bad in
virtue of so and so. But what exactly is illicit in asserting both that X (a napalm
bomb) can be a good or bad so and so (napalm bomb) but still ask whether X (a
napalm bomb) really is good or bad, without further referencing any further
standard of appraisal beyond a direct appeal to goodness or badness?53 Such an
example is not unintelligible, I suggest, pace Geach because it is both linguistically
ordinary and logically valid (in some cases at least) to say that something X simply
is good or bad.
Finnis, Aquinas and Non-naturalism 185
NJ502 - ch09  7/2/06  9:40 am  Page 185
The term good and its correlates in other languages fulfill a variety of different
linguistic roles. Not all roles are valid. Geach is right to point to many
inconsistencies in our use of good-talk that crop up, inconsistencies that are all too
ready to snare and befuddle the unsuspecting. Geach, however, is trying keep out
all uses of the predicative good, because some uses are clearly not justified. Yet the
reason why Geach cannot expurgate all uses of the predicative good, in my view, is
that ordinary people (not just odd philosophers) in their modes of speaking, unlike
Geach, are not set in opposition to the very idea of the existence of non-natural
moral properties. They are, so to speak, more “metaphysically open.” Because they
do not find the very idea of non-natural moral properties beyond the pale, they are,
in consequence, more receptive to the ontological position that goodness really is a
unique and distinct kind of property.
Ordinary people are not necessarily being sloppy or inconsistent when they use
good as a predicate, that sometimes, in addition to attributive usage, the directly
apprehended predicative good of at least some things or objects (like Finnis’s basic
human goods) can make the very pursue of them intelligible – not because we
pursue X in order to achieve Y – but simply because X really is apprehended as an
end worthy of pursuit entirely for its own sake. Ordinary people, with reflective
justification, can state that, far from being muddled or confused, careful predicative
usage cannot be banished because Geach and others are ill-disposed towards the
very idea of non-natural moral properties, for that idea alone just might (and, I
think, really does) account for a very important feature that would otherwise be left
out of our moral landscape.
7. Redundancy of Appeals to Non-Natural Properties
If the predicative good cannot be ruled out of bounds then the case for non-
naturalism cannot be dismissed by naturalists on the ground that it necessarily rests
on a conceptual mistake about our usage of the word “good.” Another attempt to
challenge non-naturalism is to reject its basic idea that non-natural properties are
needed in order to preserve the distinctiveness of ethical claims either because (a)
“X is good” means that “X is equivalent to natural property Y” or it means (b) that
“goodness and Y just are one and the same natural property.” Because moral
properties are held to be equivalent to or the same as natural properties, the creation
of additional metaphysical entities to explain the distinctiveness of our ethical
language is held to be unnecessary and yet another symptom of adherence to a
dodgy ad hoc metaphysics.
When reflecting on claims about metaphysical entities I am here reminded of
Paul Grice’s words of caution aimed at those who would, with undue eagerness,
consign odd metaphysical entities to the dustbin of ideas:
I am not greatly enamoured of … a concern to exclude such ‘queer’ or ‘mysterious’
entities as souls, purely mental events, purely mental properties and so forth. My taste is
for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions or entities, just so long as when they
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come in they help with the housework. Provided that I see them [do explanatory] work …
I do not find them queer or mysterious at all. … To exclude honest working entities seems
to me like metaphysical snobbery ….”54
Perhaps, it will be retorted, non-natural properties do not help with the housework
for they are not honest hard working entities. They simply add unnecessary
complication and clutter to any well run metaphysical household. Here I want to
present the outline of an argument for “keeping the help” of non-natural properties
that builds on insights first presented by G. E. Moore. Such a line of argument can, I
think, be a good supportive strategy to deploy in defense of Finnis’s claim that the
basic human goods are irreducible and cannot be accounted for in purely
naturalistic terms.
In Principia Ethica, Moore launches the following salvo that he thought would
expose a central weakness in all naturalistic accounts of the good:
Whatever definition is offered, it may always be asked, with significance, of the complex
so defined, whether it is itself good …. It may indeed be that what we desire to desire is
always good; perhaps even the converse may be true: but it is very doubtful that this is the
case, and the mere fact that we understand what is meant by doubting it, shows clearly
that we have two different notions before our minds.”55
Today Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), if it is invoked, is often done so
with a view to poking fun at its grand pretensions. Moore’s argument, it is claimed,
is inherently question-begging. This line of criticism is advanced by William
Frankena.56 He asks, is something we acknowledge to have natural property Y, and
is held good, always an open question? For Frankena the answer would be yes only
if the definition provided was thought to be a bad one. A question is closed if it
provides a good definition. But, crucially, for the naturalists, they do not regard
their definition as being bad. Thus OQA is seen to be question-begging because it
asserts a premise that the naturalists will simply deny, namely, that a naturalistic
definition of X cannot be a good definition of X.
I would not disagree that Frankena’s argument, as presented, is justified. Moore
himself, is notoriously vague on precisely what the frame of reference ought to be
for assessing claims of “openness.” Moore therefore lays himself open to the
charge that he is fallaciously accusing the naturalist of being caught in a strict
logical bind, that on pain of contradiction he or she must accept the non-
equivalence of good with any natural property. Frankena therefore usefully exposes
the myth of that interpretation. There is, however, an interpretation of Moore’s
basic insight that, if not Moore’s actual position, is, I think, inherently more
plausible and presents a much greater difficulty for the naturalist to contend with.
The way to understand Moore’s basic insight relates to an earlier point I made
about the use of ordinary language while discussing Geach’s assessment of
predicative uses of the word “good.” As Stephen Ball points out, the legacy of
Moore’s contribution may be that it is not so much about the openness of a question
understood in purely logical terms, as it is about the openness (irreducibility) of the
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meaning of “good” to the understanding of ordinary people and how they use
“good” (and its cognates) in their conceptual thinking about moral questions.57
Ordinary people can make sense of the possibility that analytical moral claims
concerning the equivalence of “good” and natural property Y do not capture their
ethical meaning and are therefore “open” in a way that differentiates them from the
non-openness of other analytical questions, for example, if a man is a bachelor must
he be unmarried? So understood, I think Moore’s OQA, as modified, furnishes the
non-naturalist with a direct referential framework that does not beg the question
concerning the establishment of criteria used for assessing the plausible openness
of a definition. I think it powerful enough to say that any form of naturalism (a) that
seeks to define “X is good” as meaning that “X is equivalent to natural property Y”
is going to face a well grounded objection. Henry Veatch’s ontological naturalism,
for example, does, I think, fall squarely under this type (a) category, for Veatch
reductively seeks to define the good in terms of an analysis of natural trajectories
held to be perfective of human nature. So too does Benedict Ashley’s brand of
naturalism fall under this type (a) category, for he equivalences the “good” of the
lex naturalis with an anthropological account of “basic human needs.”
Some naturalists, for example, Anthony Lisska, contend that OQA, if it is
effective against type (a) naturalism, cannot be invoked to challenge type (b)
naturalism which states that “goodness and Y just are one and the same natural
property.” Since good is not being defined in terms of the possession of natural
properties, the charge of justifying reductionism by unwarranted definition does not
apply. Lisska develops an interpretation of human “essence” as a set of
dispositional properties, properties that are dynamically ordered towards the final
cause of human flourishing.58 Goodness is not defined in terms of Y for goodness
and Y are indeed one and the same. Recent work in non-analytic type-identity
relations is said to challenge the traditional analytic/synthetic divide. It is possible
to understand propositions about the identity of natural properties like “water =
H2O” as being necessarily true without them being analytic. Given this theory of
type-identity relations, it makes no sense, given current knowledge, to say that –  “I
know X is H2O but is it water?” or “I know X is water but is it H2O?” This is a
closed question not an open one. Similarly, as for water = H2O, the property that we
call “good” really will turn out to be type-identical with a naturally occurring
property.59
Perhaps then, the reach of OQA has finally been outflanked. Naturalism is non-
reductionistic because there is no erroneous attempt made to reduce X to Y in the
first place. X simply is Y and vice versa. There is nothing to reduce. The problem
evaporates.
Is this the death nail for non-naturalism? I don’t think so. The problem with this
kind of approach is that like is not really being compared with like, for “good” is
actually a very different kind of concept from “water.” “Good” is a normative
concept (unlike water) and is not at all the kind of concept that can be shown to
identify the same sort of property as a natural concept.
Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, I think, develop a penetrating critique of
the ability of type-identity relations to get around the applicability of OQA to type
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(b) naturalism.60 Horgan and Timmons ask us to imagine different pairs of twin
earth scenarios, a device first used by Hilary Putnam to advance the case for
semantic moral naturalism. Earth _ (EA) is tied to the proposition that water and
H2O are one and the same. On Earth B (EB) they call A4Z water. It has all the
appearance of what people on EA call water but it is not H2O. They both use the
same word to co-reference different natural properties. It is just a linguistic
coincidence that EA uses water to co-reference H2O and EB uses water to co-
reference A4Z. Imagine now a second pairing. Moral Earth A (MEA) and Moral
Earth B (MEB). On MEA they co-reference good and “act such that you pursue the
greatest pleasure for the greatest number.” On MEB they co-reference good and
“act such that you pursue the inbuilt tendencies of your nature.”
Is the case between the two sets of pairs really similar? No. Horgan and
Timmons are right to argue that they are not. Comparing EA and EB we can say
that there need be no disagreement about the different natural properties being
referred to. EA people simply use water for X and EB people simply use water for
Y. There is no underlying disagreement about natural properties. When EA people
say “water” EB people know they are not talking about A4Z and when EB people
say “water” EA people know they are not talking about H2O. Here there is no
fundamental disagreement in conceptual understanding between EA and EB.
Crucially, when EA people say that water is H2O it may be confusing to EB people
and vice versa but it is not thought wrong. The situation is not the same however
when we compare the two ethical planets. In that case there is a shared
understanding of what goodness is, namely, what we ought to do, but basic
disagreement over the very standard of what it is that we ought to do. Disagreement
is a key feature because it makes sense for us to see how it occurs here in a way that
makes no sense to us when we think of the water example. If type (b) naturalism
were valid then we would not expect disagreement, only confusion. Yet MEA
people think that MEB people really are wrong in their “one and the same” claim
and vice versa. By ignoring the distinctiveness of good-talk we would fail to see
and understand the reality of moral disagreement here. The problem arises because
the distinctiveness of goodness as normative cannot be explained away by claiming
that it is a natural property identical with another natural property. Goodness cannot
be boiled down to an analogous kind of type-identity relationship found in the
water/H2O example.
Here, OQA, at the hands of Horgan and Timmons, once again springs back into
life. Ordinary MEA people will say to ordinary MEB people, “you say that X is
good, but is it good?” and vice versa. The argument, of the open and distinctive
nature of claims about the good, once again confronts type (b) naturalists who think
that their approach to naturalism (unlike type (a) naturalism) successfully outflanks
OQA. When Lisska, for example, makes use of type-identity relations to address
the punch of OQA, I think he only really succeeds in buying naturalism a temporary
reprieve, nothing more. How do we know that the end being realized by
dispositional property Y is in itself good? or Y is dynamically ordered to the pursuit
of end Z but is our pursuit of Z thus normative? These remain full-blown open
questions, the product of a powerful argument that continues to haunt the precincts
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of naturalism. Simply because a dispositional property is said to be dynamic and
not static, and good is treated as being identical with these dynamic trajectories,
pace Lisska, does not ultimately make it any less problematic as a naturalistic
claim. As with (a) type naturalism, (b) type naturalism also fails to escape the
clutches of the OQA.
8. Concluding Remarks
In the first part of this chapter I have argued against Finnis’s claim that Aquinas
was, like himself, a meta-ethical non-naturalist. I found his case wanting in the
interpretation stakes and concluded that the neo-Thomists have the upper hand as
far as interpretation goes. However, I also argued that this “victory” for the neo-
Thomists is short lived because the case for naturalism is not itself ultimately
sustainable. This imperils the future of natural law ethics to the extent that natural
law ethics is assumed to be naturalistic through and through. Fortunately for Finnis,
I found his own position, while influenced by Aquinas, quite distinct. I then moved
on to argue that the distinctiveness of Finnis’s own project opens up an alternative
path by which to defend a credible foundation for natural law ethics – meta-ethical
non-naturalism.
In the second part of the chapter, I sought to advance some defensive lines of
argument that, while not actually made by Finnis, are, in my view, needed in order
to tackle credibility problems with his allegiance to non-naturalism, especially, (1)
a defense of the notion of predicate goodness; and (2) a defense of the reality of
non-natural moral properties via a deployment of a modified form of Moore’s Open
Question argument. The use of these strategies, in my view, significantly advances
the case for the credibility of non-naturalism as a fundamental meta-ethical
alternative for the underpinning of a natural law based ethics.
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